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A method is proposed in this paper for predicting Electoral College vic-
tory probabilities from state probability data. A “ranking” assumption about
dependencies across states is made that greatly simpliﬁes the analysis. The
method is used to analyze state probability data from the Intrade political
betting market. The Intrade prices of various contracts are quite close to
what would be expected under the ranking assumption. Under the joint hy-
pothesis that the Intrade price ranking is correct and the ranking assumption
iscorrect, PresidentBushshouldnothavewonanystaterankedbelowastate
that he lost. He did not win any such state. The ranking assumption is also
consistent with the fact that the two parties spent essentially nothing in most
states in 2004.
1 Introduction
The U.S. Electoral College poses an interesting predictive problem. It can happen,
asinthe2000election, thatonecandidategetsthelargestshareofthenationalvote
∗Cowles Foundation and International Center for Finance, Yale University, New Haven, CT
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Knesevitch at Intrade for supplying me with some of the data.and yet loses the election. Predicting the winner requires more than just predicting
national vote shares. Individual state probability data are used in this paper to esti-
mate the probability of winning in the Electoral College. A “ranking” assumption
is made about dependencies across states that is different from assumptions used
inpreviousworkandthatgreatlysimpliﬁestheanalysis. Thestateprobabilitydata
are from a new data source, the Intrade political betting market.1 The data are
discussed in Section 2, the stochastic assumptions are discussed in Section 3, and
the data and ranking assumption are analyzed in Section 4 for the 2004 election.
Section5usesstochasticsimulationtoanalyzetheconsequencesofuncertainprob-
ability estimates, and Section 6 considers campaign spending under the ranking
assumption. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Intrade Data
Priortothe2004electionthewebsitewww.intrade.comallowedonetobuyandsell
contracts for each state and the District of Columbia. The contract for Iowa, for
example, stated“GWBushtowintheelectoralvotesofIowa.” Thecontractswere
in units of ten dollars, and a price of 55.0 meant that you could buy one contract
for $5.50. If Bush won Iowa, you would get back $10.00. Otherwise, you would
get back nothing. You could also sell the contract, winning $5.50 if Bush lost and
losing $4.50 if Bush won. There was also a national contract that stated “George
W Bush is re-elected as United States President.” There were also contracts for
1The Intrade data are sometimes referred to as Tradesports data. Intrade is a subdivision of
Tradesports, and the data are the same.
2variouscombinationsofstatevictories. Forexample,therewasaBushGreatplains
contract that stated “Pres George W Bush to win IA, KS, MN, NE, ND, OK, SD,
& TX.” The national contract was by far the most traded contract on Intrade. The
markets for many of the state contracts were fairly thin. An interesting discussion
of this market and others like it is in Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004a).
Table 1 presents the prices of the state contracts that existed on ﬁve different
days. The ﬁrst is September 7, 2004, the day after Labor Day. The rest are two
weeks apart. The time of day is 10:00 am Eastern for the ﬁrst, third, and fourth,
11:00 am Eastern for the second, and 6:00 am Eastern for the last. The last day is
the day of the election, and 6:00 am Eastern is the time that the ﬁrst polls open.
The states are ranked inTable 1 by the price on the last day. Many of the states
have prices close to 100.0, and many have prices close to 0.0. This, of course,
is the red state/blue state distinction that is popular in the press. On September
7 there were 13 states that had prices between 30.0 and 70.0, and on the last day
there were 6 such states. The number of electoral votes President Bush needed
to win the election was 269.2 On the last day the “pivotal” state was Ohio, with
a price of 51.1. With a little rearranging, it can be seen that on September 7 the
pivotal state was Florida, with a price of 60.5.
2The electoral vote is tied if each candidate gets 269, but a tie goes to the House of Represen-





State 9/7 9/21 10/5 10/19 11/2 Votes Votes
Montana 95.0 94.0 95.0 96.3 99.0 3 3
Oklahoma 97.0 97.0 97.0 97.0 98.4 7 10
Utah 96.0 97.0 97.0 97.5 98.0 5 15
Idaho 95.5 96.0 95.0 95.5 98.0 4 19
Texas 98.0 98.0 98.0 98.0 97.9 34 53
Wyoming 97.0 97.0 97.0 97.5 97.6 3 56
Indiana 96.0 96.0 91.2 94.4 97.4 11 67
Alaska 96.0 96.0 98.0 95.5 97.4 3 70
Louisiana 92.5 91.9 92.0 92.6 97.0 9 79
Tennessee 78.7 85.0 89.0 92.0 96.5 11 90
Kentucky 92.5 92.0 92.0 93.1 95.8 8 98
Kansas 96.0 96.0 93.5 94.1 95.8 6 104
Mississippi 96.0 96.0 94.0 94.5 95.6 6 110
Georgia 96.5 97.0 92.2 95.7 95.2 15 125
Alabama 98.0 96.0 94.0 96.5 95.2 9 134
Nebraska 96.0 97.5 94.0 95.7 95.2 5 139
South Carolina 95.0 97.0 91.0 93.7 95.1 8 147
North Dakota 96.0 96.0 92.5 95.5 95.1 3 150
South Dakota 96.0 96.0 92.0 95.7 95.1 3 153
North Carolina 81.0 93.0 87.5 89.0 94.7 15 168
Arizona 78.0 83.0 83.0 90.0 94.0 10 178
Virginia 86.0 91.0 87.5 87.8 93.2 13 191
West Virginia 67.7 77.0 77.0 79.9 92.0 5 196
Arkansas 73.0 78.0 84.0 82.0 90.0 6 202
Missouri 67.0 85.0 84.0 81.0 87.1 11 213
Colorado 75.5 76.0 75.0 79.4 77.0 9 222
Nevada 60.0 69.9 74.5 67.5 76.8 5 227
New Mexico 43.0 40.0 37.7 37.2 56.5 5 232
Florida 60.5 70.0 63.5 66.0 53.9 27 259
Ohio 63.0 72.0 67.5 57.8 51.1 20 279
Iowa 43.0 55.0 57.0 55.2 51.0 7
Wisconsin 57.0 62.0 64.0 54.5 41.0 10
New Hampshire 42.0 55.0 51.0 43.0 31.0 4
Pennsylvania 43.4 43.0 35.0 38.0 28.9 21
Hawaii 10.0 10.0 8.0 5.5 26.1 4
Minnesota 40.0 40.5 35.5 38.5 24.0 10
Michigan 33.0 29.9 23.0 19.9 11.1 17
New Jersey 15.9 24.0 18.0 16.5 10.0 15
Oregon 36.3 35.0 26.9 21.9 10.0 7
Maine 27.4 26.2 26.5 24.0 9.2 4
Delaware 16.0 18.0 13.0 9.6 5.1 3
California 9.6 11.4 8.0 6.0 3.3 55
Connecticut 8.0 7.0 7.0 5.7 3.3 7
Washington 28.0 25.0 19.0 8.0 3.0 11
Vermont 7.0 8.0 8.0 3.3 2.5 3
Illinois 8.8 12.0 8.8 6.8 2.0 21
Maryland 14.0 16.0 17.9 9.0 2.0 10
NewYork 7.0 9.9 8.4 4.9 1.7 31
Massachusetts 3.0 4.0 2.0 2.8 1.7 12
Rhode Island 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.5 1.7 4
DC 1.0 1.0 2.0 1.5 0.8 3
•Votes are electoral votes. 269 votes are needed to win for President Bush.
• President Bush won Iowa, all the states above it, and none below it.
43 StochasticAssumptions
The postulated probability structure in this paper is as follows. Assume that on
election day there are n possible “states” of nature (to be called “conditions” of
naturetoavoidconfusionwithU.S.states),eachwithprobability1/nofoccurring.
If in pi percent of the n conditions Bush wins state i, then pi is the probability that
Bush wins state i. Rank the states by pi, as was done in Table 1 using the Intrade
data. The key assumption in this paper, called the “ranking” assumption, is that
there is no condition of nature in which Bush wins state i and loses a state ranked
higher than i. If, for example, Texas is ranked higher than Massachusetts, then in
none of the n conditions of nature does Bush win Massachusetts and lose Texas.
There may be conditions in which Bush wins Massachusetts (Kerry makes some
serious error), but in these conditions Bush also wins Texas.
Under the ranking assumption it is trivial to compute the probability that Bush
wins in the Electoral College. Just go down the ranking, adding electoral votes,
until 269 is reached. If this is state j, then state j is “pivotal,” and the probability
that Bush wins the election is simply the probability that he wins state j.
It is common in previous work to assume some form of independence. Kaplan
andBarnett(2003)assumethatthestateoutcomesareindependent,that“theevents
that the candidate is leading in various states are mutually independent” (p. 33).
Snyder (1989) analyzes districts and assumes that the elections in the districts are
all statistically independent. He points out that this rules out “uncertainty about
national variables that may affect the electoral outcomes in all districts simulta-
neously, such as changes in aggregate output or foreign policy crises” (p. 646).
5Brams and Davis (1974) assume that “the voting of uncommitted voters within
each state is statistically independent” (p. 120). Strömberg (2002) assumes that
the state level popularity parameters of a candidate are independent, although he
also has a national popularity parameter.
What would it mean in the present context for the state probabilities to be
independent? On election day the probability of Bush winning statei is simply the
percent of his state i wins in the n possible conditions of nature. The probabilities
will, of course, change if the n possible conditions of nature change. Consider as
a thought experiment different sets of n possible conditions of nature on election
day. Say that Bush has done poorly in the debates in set 1 and well in set 2. One
would expect all the state probabilities to be higher for Bush in set 2. In set 2
there would fewer conditions of nature in which Bush loses any given state. The
state probabilities in this case would be positively correlated. In order for the
probabilities to be uncorrelated, the sets must differ in state-speciﬁc ways. For
example, the Republican party might be better organized in California in set 1 than
inset2,buteverythingelsethesame. Thetwosetswouldthendifferonlyregarding
the probability for California. These state-speciﬁc differences across different sets
of the n possible conditions of nature seem less likely to occur than differences
that affect all the state probabilities.
The ranking assumption does not, of course, directly concern different sets of
the n possible conditions of nature. It simply puts restrictions on the n possible
conditions of nature that exist on election day. If state i is ranked ahead of state j,
then in no condition of nature does Bush win j and lose i. The concept of different
sets of the n possible conditions of nature is not needed.
64 Analysis of the Intrade Data and the
RankingAssumption
Price Predictions
How should the prices in Table 1 be interpreted in light of the setup in Section 3?
It is assumed in this paper that the prices are estimates of what the probabilities
will be on election day—of what the n possible conditions of nature will be on
election day.3
Given the individual state prices in Table 1, the Intrade prices of various com-
bination contracts are quite close to what one would expect under the ranking
assumption. This can be seen in Table 2, which presents prices for various combi-
nation contracts along with what the ranking assumption would predict the prices
should be and what the independence assumption would predict. For the Bush
Greatplains contract, for example, the price predicted by the ranking assumption
is the price of the lowest ranked state in the contract, which for September 7 is
Minnesota with a price of 40.0. The price predicted by the independence assump-
tion is simply the product of the state prices (after dividing each price by 100 and
multiplying the ﬁnal product by 100).
It is clear from Table 2 that the predictions are much closer under the rank-
ing assumption than under the independence assumption. The worst case for the
independence assumption is Bush South, where for September 7 the ranking-
3Manski(2004)hasshownthatundercertainassumptionsaboutthebeliefsoftradersthemarket
price of a contract is not necessarily the mean belief of the traders. However, under what appear
to be plausible assumptions, this bias is either zero or small—see Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004b).
This paper is based on the assumption that the bias is zero.
7Table 2
Intrade Prices for Various Contracts
September 7, 2004 November 2, 2004
Predicted Predicted Predicted Predicted
by by by by
Intrade Ranking Independ. Intrade Ranking Independ.
Contract Price Assumption Assumption Price Assumption Assumption
Bush Greatplains 35.0 40.0 13.9 23.0 24.0 9.7
Bush OH+FL 56.9 60.5 38.1 37.0 51.1 27.5
Bush South 55.0 60.5 18.9 53.0 53.9 32.3
Bush Southwest 36.0 43.0 18.7 53.8 56.5 32.7
Kerry New England 53.7 58.0 33.5 70.0 69.0 57.1
Kerry Rustbelt 32.0 37.0 14.0 42.5 48.9 30.9
Kerry Westcoast 63.5 63.7 41.5 87.5 90.0 84.4
Notes:
• Greatplains: IA, KS, MN, NE, ND, OK, SD, & TX.
• South: SC, MS, FL,AL, GA, LA, TX, VA,AR, NC, & TN.
• Southwest: NV, NM, UT, & CO.
• New England: CT, RI, ME, VT, MA, & NH.
• Rustbelt: PA, OH, & MI.
• Westcoast: CA, OR, & WA.
assumption price is 60.5, the price for Florida, and the independence-assumption
price is 18.9. These compare to the actual price of the contract of 55.0. The only
weak case for the ranking assumption is Bush OH+FL for November 2, where the
contract price is 37.0 and the price predicted by the ranking assumption is 51.1.
Although the results in Table 2 have to be taken with some caution because the
marketsarethinlytraded,theyarestrikinglysupportiveoftherankingassumption.4
Table 3 shows the price of the national contract on each of the ﬁve days and the
price of the pivotal state. Remember that under the ranking assumption the two
prices should be the same. The table shows that the prices are quite close. On the
last day the prices differ by 4.4, but the bid/ask spread for Ohio was quite large,
and so the Ohio price may not be reliable.
4Ed Kaplan has pointed out to me that given a ranking like in Table 1, under the ranking
assumption there are only 52 possible outcomes: Bush takes all 51, Bush takes all but the last one,
Bush takes all but the last two, etc. This compares to 251 possible outcomes, about 2.25 million
billion. A remarkable economy of outcomes has been achieved by the ranking assumption!
8Table 3
Intrade Data on the National Contract
9/7 9/21 10/5 10/19 11/2
National Contract 60.2 70.0 60.0 58.5 55.5
Pivotal State 60.5 70.0 63.5 57.8 a51.1
FL FL FL OH OH
aBid/ask spread was 50.0/55.5.
TheActual Outcome
Tables 2 and 3 show that the ranking assumption is a good predictor of the In-
trade prices of the combination contracts, including the national contract. Market
participants appear to be using the ranking assumption in pricing these contracts.
These results say nothing about the accuracy of the Intrade prices in predicting the
actualoutcome. Aftertheoutcome, however, onecanconsiderthejointhypothesis
that the Intrade price ranking on the last day is correct and the ranking assumption
is correct. Under this hypothesis President Bush should not have won any state
ranked below a state that he lost. Table 1 shows that he did not win any such state.
Bush won Iowa, all the states above Iowa, and none below Iowa. The results are
100 percent in favor of the joint hypothesis!
Note fromTable 1 that Bush won all the states with a price above 50 on the last
day and lost all the states with a price below 50. Although Intrade is quite happy
about this result, it is not necessary for the joint hypothesis to be true. If, say, all
the prices on the last day were 10 percent lower, so that the price of Iowa were
45.9 rather than 51.0, the results would still be consistent with the joint hypothesis
even though Bush would have won Iowa with a price below 50.
95 Uncertain Probability Estimates
It is clear from Table 1 that the ranking of the states varies somewhat across time.
This result is not, however, inconsistent with the ranking assumption because the
assumption pertains only to the ranking on the last day. For example, the Intrade
estimates in Table 1 on September 7 are uncertain because unexpected events can
happenbetweenSeptember7andelectionday. LetPa
i betheprobabilitythatBush
wins state i on election day, and let ˆ Pa
i be the estimated probability on September
7. Let ui be the difference between the two:
ui = ˆ Pa
i − Pa
i . (1)
It is important to note that ui is an estimation error. ˆ Pa
i is uncertain, but Pa
i is not.
As discussed in Section 3, Pa
i is simply the percent of Bush wins in state i in the
n conditions of nature that exist on election day.
Surprises that happen before election day will change the estimated probabil-
ities as people update their views about the conditions of nature that will exist on
election day. A surprise negative performance by Bush in the debates would likely
lower nearly all the estimated probabilities. The fact that the ranking in Table 1
changes somewhat across time means in the present context that the ui vary across
states. There is obviously a positive correlation, since most probabilities change
in the same direction, but the correlation is not perfect. Some of a state estimation
error is thus state speciﬁc.
10Stochastic Simulation
To the extent that some of the variation in the ui is state speciﬁc, it is of interest to
examine the effects of this variation. Table 4 presents results of some stochastic
simulations that get at this question. To focus on state-speciﬁc variation, the error
terms are taken to be uncorrelated across states for the simulation work. The states
used are the 13 states with prices between 30.0 and 70.0 on September 7. For each
state i, ui is assumed to be normally distributed with mean 0 and variance σ2. σ2
is assumed to be the same across states.
The stochastic-simulation experiments were performed as follows. For each
trial 13 errors were drawn from the N(0,σ2) distribution, one per state, where σ
variedfromzerofortheﬁrstexperimentto0.05forthesixthexperiment. Consider
a given experiment, i.e., a given value of σ. Let u
(k)
i denote the error drawn for
state i on the kth trial. The probability for state i on the kth trial was computed as:
P
(k)




In this context ˆ Pa
i is the “base” probability. For each trial k the values of P
(k)
i
were ranked, the pivotal state was determined,5 and its probability, denoted P
(k)
p ,
was recorded. This was done 10,000 times, resulting in 10,000 values of P
(k)
p .
The number of times a particular state was the pivotal state was also recorded, as
was the number of times a state was above the pivotal state. Summary results are
presented in Table 4. Presented in the table are the minimum value of P
(k)
p , the
value below which 5 percent of the trial values lie, and the median. Also presented
5For this work 270, not 269, was taken to be the number of electoral votes needed to win.
11Table 4
Stochastic Simulation Results
Data for September 7, 2004
Value of σ




median .600 .597 .592 .588 .582 .576
minimum .600 .559 .522 .481 .439 .409
.05 .600 .583 .567 .551 .533 .515
# times pivotal state
WV 0 0 0 48 111 180
MO 0 0 9 91 254 400
OH 0 50 705 1416 1962 2199
FL 0 3560 4185 4278 4185 4057
NV 10000 6218 4113 2913 2236 1814
WI 0 172 988 1254 1235 1197
P A 0000 8 8 4
I A 0000 3 2 6
N M 0000 2 1 8
N H 0000 4 1 0
M N 0000 0 1 3
O R 0000 0 1
M I 0000 0 1
# times pivotal state or above
WV 10000 10000 9999 9978 9906 9783
MO 10000 10000 10000 9982 9927 9807
OH 10000 10000 10000 10000 9997 9955
FL 10000 10000 10000 10000 9996 9943
NV 10000 9819 8733 8122 7869 7753
WI 0 248 2100 3616 4556 5208
P A 0000 1 0 1 0 1
I A 0000 1 2 1 0 4
N M 0000 1 1 9 7
N H 0000 8 5 0
M N 0000 1 2 1
O R 0000 0 2
M I 0000 0 1
• The prices (base probabilities) from Table 1 for September 7 are:
WV 67.7, MO 67.0, OH 63.0, FL 60.5, NV 60.0, WI 57.0, PA 43.4,
IA 43.0, NM 43.0, NH 42.0, MN 40.0, OR 36.3, MI 33.0.
• 10000 trials per value of σ.
• P
(k)
p = probability of winning the election for the kth trial,
which is the probability of winning the pivotal state.
• .05 for P
(k)
p means the value below which 5 percent of the
trial values lie.
12are the number of times each state was pivotal and the number of times each state
was pivotal or above the pivotal.
Before discussing the results it should be noted that it can be the case in the
stochastic simulations that P
(k)
i for a particular state i is greater than the base
probability for states above the highest ranked state used (West Virginia) or less
than the base probability for states below the lowest ranked state used (Michigan).
This does not matter for the results, however, because the solutions that matter are
around the pivotal state. The stochastic simulation could have been set up using
all the states, but, as just noted, this is not necessary. If all states were used, the
assumption that the variance of the error term is the same across states would have
to be changed. The variance is obviously smaller when the base probability is near
one or zero than when it is near one half.
The results in Table 4 are easy to explain. When the variance is zero, Nevada
is always pivotal and the probability of winning the election is always .600.6 As
the variance increases, more and more states are sometimes pivotal or above the
pivotal. The median of P
(k)




by positive draws for states below Nevada. When the calculations were repeated
using .570 for the base probabilities for the states below Wisconsin (instead of
the values in Table 1 for September 7), the median of P
(k)
p rose as the variance
6In Table 3 Florida is listed as the pivotal state for September 7, whereas in Table 4 Nevada is
listed as pivotal. This difference is due to the use of 270 electoral votes to win rather than 269.
13increased. For σ = 0.01 the median was .597. The values of the median for the
increasing values of σ were, respectively, .598, .600, .603, and .605.
When σ is zero, i.e., no state-speciﬁc variation, all that matters in terms of
predicting the probability of winning the election is the probability for the pivotal
state. It does not matter, for example, how much larger the probabilities for the
statesabovethepivotalstateareorhowmuchsmallertheprobabilitiesforthestates
below the pivotal state are. As just seen, this changes when σ is non zero—the
sizes of the probabilities around the pivotal state now matter.
The stochastic simulations were repeated using the September 21 data, and
the results are presented in Table 5. These results are similar to those in Table 4,
althoughwithhigherprobabilities,exceptthatsomestatesarenowneverpivotalnor
abovethepivotal. ThefactthatthebaseprobabilitiesforIowaandNewHampshire
have risen substantially leads to these states doing all the extra work. Even with
its 21 electoral votes, Pennsylvania is never used.
6 Campaign Spending
The ranking assumption has important implications for campaign spending across
states. On election day there are postulated to be n possible conditions of nature,
oneofwhichisdrawn. Eachconditionisbasedoneverythingthathashappenedup
to the day of the election (i.e., up to the time of the draw). “Everything” includes
all the campaigning that has been done in each state. After all the campaigning is




Data for September 21, 2004
Value of σ




median .699 .694 .688 .680 .673 .667
minimum .699 .658 .617 .576 .534 .492
.05 .699 .680 .660 .642 .623 .606
# times pivotal state
M O 000027
WV 0 0 4 78 187 296
OH 0 219 1100 1733 2103 2333
FL 0 4553 4264 4016 3870 3819
NV 10000 5228 4610 3898 3265 2648
WI 0 0 22 268 532 743
I A 0003 2 7 8 0
N H 0004 1 4 7 4
# times pivotal state or above
WV 10000 10000 10000 9998 9980 9908
MO 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000
OH 10000 10000 10000 10000 9999 9971
FL 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000
NV 10000 10000 9977 9683 9277 8838
WI 0 0 48 624 1543 2456
I A 0005 7 4 2 8 5
N H 0007 5 4 3 0 0
• See notes to Table 4.
• The prices (base probabilities) from Table 1 for September 21 are:
MO 85.0, WV 77.0, OH 72.0, FL 70.0, NV 69.9, WI 62.0, IA 55.0,
NH 55.0, PA 43.0, MN 40.5, NM 40.0, OR 35.0, MI 29.9.
• PA, NM, MN, OR, and MI were never used.
that campaigning has no effect on the possible conditions of nature. It is just that
once campaigning is over, the ranking assumption holds.
Consider now the strategy of the Republican party on September 7. Assume
for now that the Republican party does not take into account any Democratic-
party response to its actions. As in Section 5, let ˆ Pa
i denote the Intrade price on
September 7. In Section 5 this price was taken to be market’s estimate of what the
15actual probability will be on election day (Pa
i ). This estimate obviously takes into
account market participants’views about how much campaigning there will be in
each state. Let ze
i denote the market’s expectation of the amount the Republican
party will spend in state i between September 7 and election day. The following
equation is then postulated:
Pa
i = ˆ Pa
i + fi(zi − ze
i) + ui (3)
where zi is the actual amount the Republican party spends in state i between
September 7 and election day. Equation (3) says that spending in a state affects the
probability of winning the state. The Republican party faces a budget constraint
that the sum of the zi’s across all the states cannot exceed some amount.
Consider ﬁrst the case in which ui in equation (3) is zero for all i. If the
Republican party wants to maximize the probability of winning the election, what
should it do? Under the ranking assumption, it simply maximizes the probability
of winning the pivotal state. In Table 1 for September 7 the pivotal state is Nevada
(assuming 270 electoral votes needed to win), which has a price of 60.0. The state
aboveitisFlorida, withapriceof60.5. ThenextstateisOhio, withapriceof63.0,
and the next state is Missouri with a price of 67.0. To take an example, say the
Republican party’s budget constraint is such that the party can spend in Nevada,
Florida, and Ohio to raise P a
i to 65.0 each. The probability of winning has thus
increased from .60 to .65, and there has been spending in just three states. (In this
exampletherewouldbeintheendnoconditionsofnatureonelectiondayinwhich
Bush won one or two of these states and lost the other.)
16Consider next the case in which ui is not zero in equation (3). Remember
that these are state-speciﬁc errors of estimation. On September 7 the Republican
party knows that it can change the actual probabilities that will exist on election
day, but when there are estimation errors it does not know the actual values that
will exit. What should be the objective of the party in this case? Go back to the
stochastic-simulation setup in Section 5, and assume that the 13 states in Table 4
are in play. Let z denote the vector of the 13 zi values, and let u denote the vector
of the 13 ui values. Given z and u, it is straightforward to compute the probability
that the Republican party wins the election. The values of Pa
i can be computed
from equation (3) (assuming also knowledge of the ze
i) and then the values ranked
to determine the pivotal-state value. For the given value of z this can be done, say,
for 10,000 draws of u. This gives 10,000 values of the probability of winning the
election, from which summary measures like those in Table 4 can be computed.
OnecanthinkoftheRepublicanpartyconsideringmanyvaluesofzandforeach
value computing 10,000 probabilities and summary measures like those in Table
4. Its objective might be to choose z to maximize the median of the probability
values, the minimum of the values, or the value below which 5 percent of the trial
values lie. This last option means that there would be a 95 percent chance that
the actual probability of winning on election day is above the maximized value.
Whateverismaximized,Table4showsthattheoptimalstrategyforthepartywould
be to allocate some of its spending to states below Nevada, the pivotal state when
the errors are zero. Some states that are below Nevada now have, depending on
the draw for u, some chance of being pivotal, and so it would be optimal to spend
something on these states.
17The addition of uncertainty has thus increased the number of states in which
spending is done. Table 4 shows that as the variance of the error term increases,
the number of states that are sometimes pivotal increases. Thus, the larger the
variance, the larger the number of states in which spending is done.
Consider ﬁnally the Democratic-party response to a Republican-party move.
In any given presidential election the two parties generally have similar resources
and similar information. It also seems likely that the effects of spending on votes
are similar between the two parties. If there is complete symmetry between the
two parties and, say, the Republicans move ﬁrst, then the Democrats can merely
offset whatever the Republicans do. In practice this seems to be roughly the
case. Both parties focus their spending on the swing states and come close to
matching each other by state in terms of number of visits by the candidates and
advertising spending. If one party begins to do more in a key state, the other party
tends to respond. Also, there is essentially no spending in many states, which, as
discussednext, isconsistentwiththerankingassumptionbutnottheindependence
assumption.
No attempt is made in this paper to set up a formal game between the two
parties under the ranking assumption. This is a possibly interesting area for future
work. With a probability structure like that inTable 1, where many states are close
to zero or one, it seems clear from the results in Table 4 that if a game is set up
usingtherankingassumption,therearelikelytobemanystatesinwhichthereisno
spending by either party. This is contrary to results in the literature that are based
on the independence assumption. In the model of Snyder (1989), for example,
spending is high in states that are close and that have a high probability of being
18pivotal, but there is some spending in all states. The same is true for the model
in Strömberg (2002). In the model of Brams and Davis (1974) there is spending
in all states, where spending is in proportion to the 3/2’s power of the number of
electoral votes in each state.
7 Conclusion
Althoughtherankingassumptionisobviouslyonlyanapproximation, itappearsto
be a very good one. It is consistent with the way combination contracts are priced
on Intrade, and the actual outcome of the 2004 election is completely in line with
the joint hypothesis that the Intrade ranking is correct and the ranking assumption
is correct. The ranking assumption is also consistent with the fact that the two
parties spent essentially nothing in most states in 2004.
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